https://www.youtube.com/watch?

v=4r4mpgSMW7U
Alfred Lambremont Webre:

Why I exposed Kevin Annett & ITCCS

When the Queen is tried and found to be criminal what are her representatives

The Attorney General wears many hats and one judicial like Crown
Their illegal legal system brings out the worst in us all
They walked through Jesus and the people watched and now uninformed will miss the opportunity to convert
to a legal independent judiciary administered consistent with the Grain thereby ransacked to dying day
causing us to be thankful WW III on the move.
http://exopolitics.blogs.com/exopolitics/2013/03/my-entry.html
Arrest warrants Pope Francis, Queen Elizabeth, Pope Benedict XVI, Prime Minister Harper
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9XttXhxYIKI
Downfall of the Vatican, the Queen and the system
February 25 2013
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ormOIlOi4Vc
Sentencing
http://www.scribd.com/doc/113882977/Spirit-Intent-Precedence-de-Jure-Constitution-or-Romans-13-Gaming-the-System-de-Facto
http://www.scribd.com/doc/112431371/Would-a-Government-Appointed-Court-of-Competent-Jurisdiction-Independent-JudiciaryBe-Appropriate-to-Protect-Us-From-Appropriating-Governments

http://www.linkedin.com/pub/dir/Jonathan/Swainger/

http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/ag/agrole.asp

Roles and Responsibilities of the Attorney General

The Attorney General has a unique role to play as a Minister.
One part of the Attorney General's role is that of a Cabinet Minister. In this capacity the Minister is responsible for
representing the interests and perspectives of the Ministry at Cabinet, while simultaneously representing the interests
and perspectives of Cabinet and consequently the Government to the Ministry and the Ministry's communities of
interest.
The Attorney General is the chief law officer of the Executive Council. The responsibilities stemming from this role
are unlike those of any other Cabinet member. The role has been referred to as "judicial-like" and as the "guardian of
the public interest".
Much has been written on the subject of ministerial responsibilities and the unique role of the Attorney General.
There are various components of the Attorney General's role. The Attorney General has unique responsibilities to the
Crown, the courts, the Legislature and the executive branch of government. While there are different emphases and
nuances attached to these there is a general theme throughout all the various aspects of the Attorney General's
responsibilities that the office has a constitutional and traditional responsibility beyond that of a political minister.
The statutory responsibilities of the office are found in section 5 of the Ministry of the Attorney General Act. Section 5
states:
The Attorney General,
(a) is the Law Officer of the Executive Council;
(b) shall see that the administration of public affairs is in accordance with the law;
(c) shall superintend all matters connected with the administration of justice in Ontario;
(d) shall perform the duties and have the powers that belong to the Attorney General and Solicitor General of England
by law and usage, so far as those powers and duties are applicable to Ontario, and also shall perform the duties and
powers that, until the Constitution Act, 1867 came into effect, belonged to the offices of the Attorney General and
Solicitor General in the provinces of Canada and Upper Canada and which, under the provisions of that Act, are within
the scope of the powers of the Legislature;
(e) shall advise the Government upon all matters of law connected with legislative enactments and upon all matters of
law referred to him or her by the Government;
(f) shall advise the Government upon all matters of a legislative nature and superintend all Government measures of a
legislative nature;
(g) shall advise the heads of ministries and agencies of Government upon all matters of law connected with such
ministries and agency;
(h) shall conduct and regulate all litigation for and against the Crown or any ministry or agency of government in
respect of any subject within the authority or jurisdiction of the Legislature;
(i) shall superintend all matters connected with judicial offices;
(j) shall perform such other functions as are assigned to him or her by the Legislature or by the Lieutenant Governor in
Council. "
What follows is an overview of the various components of the Attorney General's roles and responsibilities, primarily
as outlined in the Act.

Chief Law Officer of the Executive Council (s. 5(a))

The role of chief law officer might be referred to as the Attorney General's overall responsibility as the independent
legal advisor to the Cabinet - and some have even suggested that the role possibly extends to the Legislature as well.

The importance of the independence of the role is fundamental to the position and well established in common law,
statutes and

tradition.

As chief law officer, the Attorney General has a special responsibility to be the guardian of that most elusive
concept - the rule of law. The rule of law is a well established legal principle, but hard to easily define. It is the rule of
law that protects individuals, and society as a whole, from arbitrary measures and safeguards personal liberties.
The Attorney General has a special role to play in advising Cabinet to ensure the rule of law is maintained and that
Cabinet actions are

legally and constitutionally valid.

In providing such advice it is important to keep in mind the distinction between the Attorney General's policy advice
and preference and the legal advice being presented to Cabinet. The Attorney General's legal advice or constitutional
advice should not be lightly disregarded. The Attorney General's policy advice has the same weight as that of other
ministers.

Criminal prosecutions (s.5(d))

One of the most publicly scrutinized aspects of the Attorney General's role is the responsibility for criminal
prosecutions encompassed in section 5 (d) and s. 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Section 92 gives the provinces
authority to legislate in matters related to the administration of criminal justice and thereby gives the provincial
Attorney General authority to prosecute offences under the Criminal Code.
The Attorney General does not, however, direct or cause charges to be laid. While the Attorney General and the
Attorney General's agents may provide legal advice to the police, the ultimate decision whether or not to lay charges is

the decision

for the police. Once the charge is laid

as to whether the prosecution should proceed, and in
what manner, is for the Attorney General and the Crown Attorney.
It is now an accepted and important constitutional principle that the Attorney General must carry out the Minister's
criminal prosecution responsibilities independent of Cabinet and of any partisan political pressures. The Attorney
General's responsibility for individual criminal prosecutions must be undertaken - and seen to be undertaken - on
strictly objective and legal criteria, free of any political considerations. Whether to initiate or stay a criminal
proceeding is not an issue of government policy. This responsibility has been characterized as a matter of the

Attorney General acting as the Queen's Attorney not as a Minister of the government of the day.
This is not to suggest that decisions regarding criminal prosecutions are made in a complete vacuum. A wide range of
policy considerations may be weighed in executing this responsibility, and the Attorney General may choose to consult
the Cabinet on some of these considerations. However any decisions relating to the conduct of individual prosecutions
must be the Attorney General's alone and independent of the traditional Cabinet decision making process. In practice,
in the vast majority of cases, these decisions are made by the Attorney General's agents, the Crown Attorneys.
An important part of the

Crown's - and thus the Attorney General's

- responsibility in conducting criminal prosecutions is associated with the
responsibility to represent the public interest
- which

includes not only the community as a whole

and

the victim,
but also

the accused.
3

The Crown has a distinct responsibility to the court to present all the credible evidence
available.
The responsibility is to present the case fairly - not necessarily to convict. This is a fundamental precept of criminal
law, even if it is not a particularly well-understood concept among the general public. One of the Attorney General's
responsibilities in fostering public respect for the rule of law, is to assist the public in understanding the nature and
limits of the prosecutorial function.
Ultimately the Attorney General is accountable to the people of the province, through the Legislature, for decisions
relating to criminal prosecutions. Such accountability can only occur, of course, once the prosecution is completed or
when a final decision has been made not to prosecute. The sub judicae rule bars any comment on a matter before the
courts that is likely to influence the matter. The sub judicae rule strictly prohibits the Attorney General from
commenting on prosecutions that are before the courts. Given the stature of the Attorney General's position, any public
comment coming from the office would be seen as an attempt to influence the case.
Although the Attorney general can become involved in decision-making in relation to individual criminal cases, such a
practice would leave the Minister vulnerable to accusations of political interference. Accordingly, it is traditional to
leave the day-to-day decision-making in the hands of the Attorney General's agents, the Crown Attorneys, except in
cases of exceptional importance where the public would expect the Attorney General to be briefed.

Legislative Responsibilities (s. 5(e) and (f))

The Attorney General has broad responsibilities associated with Government legislation. These responsibilities have
been described as twofold. One is to oversee that all legislative enactments are in accordance with principles of natural
justice and civil rights (see also s. 5(b) above). This is obviously an important and broad area of responsibility. The
second aspect of this responsibility is to advise on the constitutionality and legality of legislation.
The Attorney General's legislative responsibilities are played out in a variety roles. The Office of Legislative Counsel
reports to the Attorney General. Legislative Counsel plays a key role in ensuring the legal integrity of Government
legislation. Although the Legislative Counsel's reporting relationship to the Attorney General does allow the Attorney
General to provide guidance and set standards, individual pieces of legislation are drafted on instructions from client
ministries and are not within the sole control of Legislative Counsel or the Attorney General. It should also be noted
that Legislative Counsel also has a direct responsibility to the Legislature as the Office also drafts all private member's
bills.
The Attorney General has a further role to play as part of whatever Cabinet Committee is formed to review legislation
and regulations. Here the Minister has an opportunity to comment on the technical issues related to legislation and
regulations prior to Cabinet consideration.
The Attorney General's role on legislative matters is as an adviser to the Cabinet. Although unlikely, Cabinet could, in
theory, receive the Attorney General's legal opinion on legislation and choose to disregard it. The Attorney General's
role is not independent of Cabinet decision making as in the area of criminal prosecutions. As was noted earlier, the
Attorney General must make careful distinctions about the legal opinions and policy or political preferences being
offered about legislation.

Civil Litigation (s.5(h) and (d))

In addition to the specific responsibilities to conduct civil litigation on behalf of the Government and its agencies (s.
5(h)), the Attorney General has broader litigation responsibilities flowing from the historical powers of the Attorney
General referred to in s. 5(d) of the Act. These powers are based on the Crown's parens patriae (parental) authority. The
Attorney General's authority, therefore, is not only to conduct litigation in cases directly affecting the government or its
agencies but

also to litigate cases where there is a clear matter of public interest or public rights at stake.
4

This has been characterized as a constitutional responsibility to ensure that the public interest is well and
independently represented. It may involve interventions in private litigation or Charter challenges to legislation, even if
the arguments conclude that the legislation does contravene constitutionally protected rights.

Responsibility for Court Administration (s. 5(c))

A key component of the Attorney General's responsibilities to ensure the administration of justice in the province is the
administration of the courts and as a result the responsibility for maintaining liaison with the judiciary.

Given the fundamental importance of the independence of the judiciary, the responsibility for courts
administration is often a very sensitive and delicate issue.
Great care and respect for the principles of judicial independence must be exercised in this area.

The
Attorney General is the chief law officer of the Executive Council. The responsibilities stemming from this role are
unlike those of any other Cabinet member. The role has been referred to as

"judicial-like" and as the "guardian of the public interest".

Clear Conflict of Interest

The Attorney General wears many hats and one judicial like Crown
It is now an accepted and important constitutional principle that the Attorney General must carry out the
Minister's criminal prosecution responsibilities independent of Cabinet and of any partisan political
pressures. The Attorney General's responsibility for individual criminal prosecutions must be undertaken and seen to be undertaken - on strictly objective and legal criteria, free of any political considerations.
Whether to initiate or stay a criminal proceeding is not an issue of government policy. This responsibility has
been characterized as a matter of

the Attorney General acting as the Queen's Attorney not as a Minister of the government of the day.
An important part of the

Crown's - and thus the Attorney General's

- responsibility in conducting criminal prosecutions is associated with the
responsibility to represent the public interest
- which

includes not only the community as a whole

and

the victim,
but also

the accused.
The Crown has a distinct responsibility to the court to present all the credible evidence available.

Attorney General legislated with the

RUNS
Responsibly Unaccountable Nuances Schematic
Attorney General, guardian of the public interest
13. (1) The Attorney General for Ontario shall serve as the guardian of the public interest in all matters within the
scope of this Act or having to do in any way with the practice of law in Ontario or the provision of legal services in
Ontario, and for this purpose he or she may at any time require the production of any document or thing pertaining to
the affairs of the Society. R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, s. 13 (1); 1998, c. 21, s. 7 (1); 2006, c. 21, Sched. C, s. 13.
Admissions
(2) No admission of any person in any document or thing produced under subsection (1) is admissible in evidence
against that person in any proceedings other than proceedings under this Act. R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, s. 13 (2); 1998,
c. 21, s. 7 (2).
Protection of Minister
(3) No person who is or has been the Attorney General for Ontario is subject to any proceedings of the Society or to
any penalty imposed under this Act for anything done by him or her while exercising the functions of such office.
R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, s. 13 (3); 1998, c. 21, s. 7 (3).

March 29, 2007

On several occasions I have requested Bruce Herridge inform me as to what efforts he has made to this
promise with no response.

www.RCMP.frank13.com www.Docket13.frank13.com www.IyffyI.com

Victim
Accused
Public Interest
www.Frank13.com
I stand alone against the Crown until the kindred are Grown
US President of the Crown corporation
http://www.youtube.com/watch?NR=1&feature=endscreen&v=X5L_x6RHE4s
Empire of the City Vatican, London, DC
AMEN
Satanic God
Retired Major-General when coherent admits war racket
http://www.wanttoknow.info/warisaracket
Military corruption USA Billions if not trillions 1/29/02
http://www.wanttoknow.info/corruptiongovernmentmilitary
2/9/10
10 Years if you think Government corrupt USA

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sSYLdoRwkrs
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W0xzsbSbVUE
After overcoming the willing suspension of disbelief
High Ranking US Major General Exposes September 11
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=68LUHa_-OlA
CIA Whistleblower Susan Lindauer EXPOSES Everything! "Extreme Prejudice"
WhenitisnosecretItisnosecretwhyinvokingthestatesecretsprivilege.

Kindergarten Confidential
When the crook investigates self claiming evidence against is confidential we have a serious conflict of
interest dontcha know
Truth kills truth saves Save yourself and the world
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=3117338213439292490#
Ooops Video gone
Replaced
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sPIfgmuN4ns
In this lecture by Michel Chossudovsky, he blows away the smokescreen put up by the mainstream media, that 9/11 was an attack
on America by "Islamic terrorists". Through meticulous research, he has uncovered a military-intelligence ploy behind the
September 11 attacks, and the cover-up and complicity of key members of the Bush Administration. According to Chossudovsky, the
"war on terrorism" is a complete fabrication based on the illusion that one man, Osama bin Laden, outwitted the $40 billion-a-year
American intelligence apparatus. The "war on terrorism" is a war of conquest. Globalisation is the final march to the "New World
Order", dominated by Wall Street and the U.S. military-industrial complex. September 11, 2001 provides a justification for waging a
war without borders. Washington's agenda consists in extending the frontiers of the American Empire to facilitate complete U.S.
corporate control, while installing within America the institutions of the Homeland Security State.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bvay28lZiHU
Truth Kills

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8K9dgqKmJ50&feature
Fema Detention Camps Marshall Law
http://www.infowars.com/obama-implementing-martial-law-coup/
http://www.scribd.com/doc/53187051/To-United-Nations
http://www.scribd.com/doc/57985401/To-United-Nations-Again

www.911Bushwhack.com
StateSecretPrivilege

Bush9/11Coverup

ThestatesecretsprivilegeisanevidentiaryrulecreatedbyUnitedStateslegalprecedent.Applicationoftheprivilege
resultsinexclusionofevidencefromalegalcasebasedsolelyonaffidavitssubmittedbythegovernmentstatingthat
courtproceedingsmightdisclosesensitiveinformationwhichmightendangernationalsecurity. [1][2][3][4][5][6]United
Statesv.Reynolds,[7]whichinvolvedmilitarysecrets,wasthefirstcasethatsawformalrecognitionoftheprivilege.
Followingaclaimof"statesecretsprivilege",thecourtrarelyconductsanincameraexaminationoftheevidenceto
evaluatewhetherthereissufficientcausetosupporttheuseofthisdoctrine.Thisresultsincourtrulingsinwhicheven
thejudgehasnotverifiedtheveracityoftheassertion. [1]Theprivilegedmaterialiscompletelyremovedfromthe
litigation,andthecourtmustdeterminehowtheunavailabilityoftheprivilegedinformationaffectsthecase. [3][5]

[edit]Function
Thepurposeofthestatesecretsprivilegeistopreventcourtsfromrevealingstatesecretsinthecourseofcivil
litigation(incriminalcases,theClassifiedInformationProceduresActservesthesamepurpose).Thegovernmentmay
interveneinanycivilsuit,includingwhenitisnotapartytothelitigation,toaskthecourttoexcludestatesecrets
evidence.Whilethecourtsmayexaminesuchevidenceclosely,inpracticetheygenerallydefertotheExecutive
Branch.Oncethecourthasagreedthatevidenceissubjecttothestatesecretsprivilege,itisexcludedfromthe
litigation.Often,asapracticalmatter,theplaintiffcannotcontinuethesuitwithouttheprivilegedinformation,and
dropsthecase.Recently,courtshavebeenmoreinclinedtodismisscasesoutright,ifthesubjectmatterofthecaseisa
statesecret.

[edit]Distinguishedfromotherlegaldoctrines
Thestatesecretsprivilegeisrelatedto,butdistinctfrom,severalotherlegaldoctrines:theprincipleofnon
justiciabilityincertaincasesinvolvingstatesecrets(thesocalled"TottenRule");[8]certainprohibitionsonthe
publicationofclassifiedinformation(asinNewYorkTimesCo.v.UnitedStates,thePentagonPaperscase);andthe
useofclassifiedinformationincriminalcases(governedbytheClassifiedInformationProceduresAct).

[edit]History
[edit]Origins
ThedoctrinewaseffectivelyimportedfromBritishlawwhichhasasimilarprivilege.[1][2]Itisdebatablewhetherthe
statesecretsprivilegeisbaseduponthePresident'spowersascommanderinchiefandleaderofforeignaffairs(as
suggestedinUnitedStatesv.Nixon)orderivedfromtheideaofseparationofpowers(assuggestedinUnitedStatesv.
Reynolds)[1]ItseemsthattheUSprivilege"hasitsinitialrootsinAaronBurr'strialfortreason."Inthiscase,itwas

10

allegedthataletterfromGeneralJamesWilkinsontoPresidentThomasJeffersonmightcontainstatesecretsandcould
thereforenotbedivulgedwithoutrisktonationalsecurity. [1]

[edit]SupremeCourtrecognitioninUnitedStatesv.Reynolds
TheprivilegewasfirstofficiallyrecognizedbytheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesinthe1953decisionUnited
Statesv.Reynolds(345U.S.1).Amilitaryairplane,aB29Superfortressbomber,crashed.Thewidowsofthree
civiliancrewmemberssoughtaccidentreportsonthecrashbutweretoldthattoreleasesuchdetailswouldthreaten
nationalsecuritybyrevealingthebomber'stopsecretmission. [1][2][3][4][5][6][9][10]Thecourtheldthatonlythegovernment
canclaimorwaivetheprivilege,anditisnottobelightlyinvoked,andlasttheremustbeaformalclaimof
privilege,lodgedbytheheadofthedepartmentwhichhascontroloverthematter,afteractualpersonalconsideration
bythatofficer.[1]Thecourtstressedthatthedecisiontowithholdevidenceistobemadebythepresidingjudgeand
nottheexecutive.[1]
In2000,theaccidentreportsweredeclassifiedandreleased,anditwasfoundthattheassertionthattheycontained
secretinformationwasfraudulent.Thereportsdid,however,containinformationaboutthepoorconditionofthe
aircraftitself,whichwouldhavebeenverycompromisingtotheAirForce'scase.Manycommentatorshavealleged
governmentmisuseofsecrecyinthislandmarkcase. [11]
Despitethisruling,acasemightstillbesubjecttojudicialreviewsincetheprivilegewasintendedtopreventcertain,
butnotall,informationtobeprecluded.[1]

[edit]Recentuse
AccordingtoformerWhiteHouseCounsel,JohnDean:

Whileprecisenumbersarehardtocomeby(becausenotallcasesarereported),arecentstudyreportsthatthe"Bush
administrationhasinvokedthestatesecretsprivilegein23casessince2001."Bywayofcomparison,"between1953
and1976,thegovernmentinvokedtheprivilegeinonlyfourcases." [9]
WhileHenryLanmanreportsinSlate:
"...theReportersCommitteeforFreedomofthePressreportedthatwhilethegovernmentassertedtheprivilege
approximately55timesintotalbetween1954(theprivilegewasfirstrecognizedin1953)and2001,it'sassertedit23
timesinthefouryearsafterSept.11."[10][12]
However,atleastonearticlehasretractedthesefigures,findingtheywerebasedonerroneousinformation:
"Correction:Inthisarticle,weincorrectlyreportedthatthegovernmentinvokedthestatesecretsprivilegein23cases
since2001.Thefigurecamefromthe2005SecrecyReportCardpublishedbyOpenTheGovernment.org.Theprivilege
wasactuallyinvokedseventimesfrom2001to2005,accordingtothecorrected2005reportcard,whichisnotan
increasefrompreviousdecades"[13]
LanmancontinuestocitetwopoliticalscienceprofessorsattheUniversityofTexasElPasowhoconcludedthat
"courtshaveexaminedthedocuments'underlyingclaimsofstatesecrecyfewerthanonethirdofthetimesithasbeen
invoked.And,...,courtshaveonlyactuallyrejectedtheassertionoftheprivilegefourtimessince1953." [10]
FollowingtheSeptember11,2001attacks,theprivilegeisincreasinglyusedtodismissentirecourtcases,insteadof
onlywithholdingthesensitiveinformationfromacase. [1]Alsoin2001,GeorgeW.BushissuedExecutiveOrder

11

13233extendingtheaccessibilityofthestatesecretsprivilegetoalsoallowformerpresidents,theirdesignated
representatives,orrepresentativesdesignatedbytheirfamilies,toinvokeittobarrecordsfromtheirtenure. [5]
AnarticleintheNYT,inAugust2007,onalawsuitinvolvingSocietyforWorldwideInterbankFinancial
TelecommunicationconcludesthatitwouldseemthattheunprecedentedfrequencywithwhichtheBush
administrationinvokedandinvokesthisprinciplehasmadejudgesmoreskepticalandwillingtoaskthegovernmentto
validateitsclaims.InthewordsofTomBlanton,directoroftheNationalSecurityArchiveatGeorgeWashington
University
"Whatseemsclearisthatuntilayearortwoago,thejudgesrarelyevenquestioneditwhenthegovernmentraisedthe
'statesecrets'claim.Itwasaneutronbombnoplaintiffsleftstanding.Butwe'renowseeingthatjudgesarestartingto
actuallylookbehindthegovernment'ssecrecyclaimsandseewhat'sreallythere." [14]

[edit]Criticism
Since2001,therehasbeenmountingcriticismofthestatesecretsprivilege.Suchcriticismgenerallyfallsintofour
categories:

[edit]Weakexternalvalidationofexecutiveassertionofprivilege
Manycommentatorshaveexpressedconcernthatthecourtsnevereffectivelyscrutinizeexecutiveclaimsofprivilege.
[1]
Lackingindependentnationalsecurityexpertise,judgesfrequentlydefertothejudgmentoftheexecutiveandnever
subjectexecutiveclaimstomeaningfulscrutiny.

[edit]Executiveabuseoftheprivilegetoconcealembarrassingfacts
Commentatorshavesuggestedthatthestatesecretsprivilegemightbeusedasoftentopreventdisclosureof
embarrassingfactsastoprotectlegitimatesecrets. [1][2][3][4][5][10][15][16]Or,inthewordsofProfessorsWilliamG.Weaver
andRobertM.PallittoinanarticleinthePoliticalScienceQuarterly:
"[T]heincentiveonthepartofadministratorsistousetheprivilegetoavoidembarrassment,handicappolitical
enemies,andtopreventcriminalinvestigationofadministrativeaction." [13][17]
Inseveralprominentcases,theevidencethatthegovernmentsuccessfullyexcludedwaslaterrevealedtocontainno
statesecrets.i.e.UnitedStatesv.Reynolds,Sterlingv.Tenet,Edmondsv.DepartmentofJusticeandthePentagon
Papers.

[edit]Expansionintoajusticiabilitydoctrine
Someacademicsandpractitionershavecriticizedtheexpansionofthestatesecretsprivilegefromanevidentiary
privilege(designedtoexcludecertainpiecesofevidence)toajusticiabilitydoctrine(designedtoexcludeentire
lawsuits).Underitsoriginalformulation,thestatesecretsprivilegewasmeantonlytoexcludeaverynarrowclassof
evidencewhoserevelationwouldharmnationalsecurity.However,inalargepercentageofrecentcases,courtshave
goneastepfurther,dismissingentirecasesinwhichthegovernmentassertstheprivilege,inessenceconvertingan
evidentiaryruleintoajusticiabilityrule.Thegovernmentresponsehasbeenthatincertaincases,thesubjectofthe
caseisitselfprivileged.Inthesecases,thegovernmentargues,thereisnoplausiblewaytorespondtoacomplaint
withoutrevealingstatesecrets.

12

[edit]Eliminationofjudicialcheckonexecutivepower
GlennGreenwaldallegesthattheBushadministrationattemptedtoexpandexecutivepower,asevidencedbythe
unitaryexecutivetheorypropagatedbyJohnYoo.ThetheorysuggeststhatthePresident,asCommanderinChief,
cannotbeboundbyCongressoranylaw,nationalorinternational.Byinvokingthestatesecretsprivilegeincases
involvingactionstakeninthewaronterror(i.e.extraordinaryrendition,allegationsoftorture,allegedlyviolatingthe
ForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceAct)[18]Greenwaldopinestheadministrationtriedtoevadejudicialreviewofthese
claimsofexceptionalwarpowers.Ineffect,thisispreventingajudicialrulingdeterminingwhetherthereisalegal
basisforsuchexpansiveexecutivepower.[12][19]Withthatinmind,applyingthisprivilegemakesimpeachmenttheonly
possiblemeansleftforCongresstoexercisetheirdutytoupholdthechecksandbalancesconstitutionallyintendedto
preventabuseofpower.[2][13][16]

[edit]Callsforreform
Seealso:StateSecretsProtectionAct

Inrecentyears,anumberofcommentatorshavecalledforlegislativereformstothestatesecretsprivilege. [20][21][22]
Thesereformscenteraroundseveralideas:
1.
2.

Requiringjudgestorevieweachpieceofevidencethattheexecutiveclaimsissubjecttotheprivilege. [20][23][24]
Requiringtheexecutivetocraftalternativeevidencethatisnotsubjecttotheprivilege,fortheopposingparty
touseinplaceoftheoriginal,privilegedevidence. [23]Suchsubstituteevidenceshouldonlyberequiredwhenit
ispossibletodosowithoutharmingnationalsecurity.

3.

Prohibitingcourtsfromdismissingclaimsonthebasisofthestatesecretsprivilegeuntilaftertheyhave
reviewedallavailableevidence.

4.

Permittingthecourttoappointanoutsideexperttoscrutinizetheevidencefornationalsecuritycontent. [21]

5.

Excludingillegalgovernmentactionfromthedefinitionof"statesecrets,"orotherwiseallowingthecourtto
addressthelegality(insteadofjustthesecrecy)ofgovernmentconduct.Thiswouldpreventthegovernment
fromusingthestatesecretsprivilegetoconcealitsillegalconduct. [21]

OnJanuary22,2008,SenatorsEdwardKennedyandArlenSpecterintroducedS.2533,theStateSecretsProtection
Act.[25]

[edit]Courtcases
[edit]UnitedStatesv.Reynolds
Main article: UnitedStatesv.Reynolds
In United States v. Reynolds (1953), the widows of three crew members of a B29Superfortress bomber
that had crashed in 1948 sought accident reports on the crash, but were told the release such details would
threaten national security by revealing the nature of the bomber's top-secret mission. The Supreme Court
ruled that the executive branch could bar evidence from the court if it deemed that its release would impair
national security. In 1996, the accident reports in question were declassified and released, and when
discovered in 2000 were found to contain no secret information. They did, however, contain information
about the poor condition of the aircraft itself, which would have been very compromising to the Air Force's
case. Many legal experts have alleged government abuse of secrecy in this landmark case. [2][3][5][9][10]
[edit]RichardHorn
Mainarticles:RichardHornandHornv.Albright

13

FormerDEAagentRichardHornbroughtasuitagainsttheCIAforbugginghishome.Thecasewasdismissed
becauseoftheprivilege.[1][6]
RichardHorn'scasewasreinstatedonJuly20,2009byUSDCJudgeRoyceC.LambrethonthebasisthattheCIAhad
engagedinfraudonthecourt.
On30March2010,asaresultofamultimilliondollarsettlementagreementbetweenHornandthegovernment,
Lamberthdismissedtheunderlyingcasewithprejudice.Subsequently,laterthatsameyear,ina22Septemberorder,
LamberthissuedafinalordervacatinghisearlieropinionsandordersfindingthatCIAlawyers,Tenet,andBrownhad
committedfraudonthecourt.Lamberthalsospecificallyorderedthatasentenceberemovedfromhis30March2010
Memorandum.Theremovedsentencehadstatedthat"allegationsofwrongdoingbythegovernmentattorneysinthis
casearenotonlycredible,theyareadmitted."

[edit]NotraTrulock
InFebruary2002itwasinvokedinthecaseofNotraTrulock,wholaunchedadefamationsuitagainstLosAlamos
scientistWenHoLee,chargedwithstealingnuclearsecrets;PresidentBushstatedthatnationalsecuritywouldbe
compromisedifTrulockwereallowedtoseekdamagesfromLee;thoughitresultedinthecasebeingdismissed,
anothersuitwaslauncheddirectlyattackingthenFBIDirectorLouisFreehforinterferingandfalselyinvokingthe
statesecretsprivilege.

[edit]SibelEdmonds
Mainarticle:SibelEdmonds

Eqilibriumhangsinthebalance

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www.DamageControl13.com

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